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Background  
The objectives of the 2008/9 Malawi Agricultural 
Input Subsidy Programme (MAISP, now termed 
the Farm Input Subsidy Programme, FISP), were 
to improve national and household food security 
and self sufficiency and incomes through 
increased food and cash crop production and 
productivity, by improving accessibility and 
affordability of agricultural inputs among the 
most vulnerable farmers.  
Figure 1 sets out the potential positive impacts of 
a large scale agricultural inputs subsidy 
programme. In 2008/9, 65% of Malawian rural 
households received one or more fertiliser 
coupons. Such a large programme not only 
directly affects coupon recipients and input 
suppliers, it also affects crop and labour markets 
and indirectly affects the macro-economy and the 
livelihoods, activities and welfare of others in the 
country through these and other markets.  
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Figure 1. Potential impacts of a large scale 
agricultural inputs subsidy programme 
 
Production impacts  
The core of the programme is the transfer to 
selected rural households of a voucher which will 
benefit them either by enabling increased use of 
fertiliser, seed or pesticides or by effectively 
giving them a cash transfer if they sell the voucher 
or use it to buy inputs they would have bought 
anyway. If the voucher leads to increased input use it 
should lead to increased agricultural land and labour 
productivity and crop production.  
Critical components of estimating incremental 
production from the MAISP are an understanding of 
(a) yield increments obtained from the use of inputs 
and (b) the incremental use of fertilisers and seeds as a 
result of the programme.  
There are major difficulties in obtaining consistent and 
unbiased estimates of smallholder crop areas and yields 
in Malawi. Maize production and area estimates were 
obtained by asking farmers about their plot areas and 
production in a large scale nationally representative 
survey, and for some households yields in small 
demarcated sub-plots were also measured by 
enumerators or farmers, with rough measurement of 
the areas of the plots in which the subplots were 
situated. Consequent yield, area and production 
estimates from these different methods were compared 
with previous surveys where possible, with MoAFS 
estimates, and with budgets for national maize 
production and consumption. Significant 
inconsistencies were found across maize yields, areas 
and production in different reports based on different 
methods and sources, with different sources of bias 
affecting different methods. Estimates of maize yield 
responses to nitrogen were also affected by problems 
of multi-collinearity.  
In analysis of these figures it has become clear that 
current widely used methods that rely on farmer 
reported yields and areas lead to over estimation of 
crop areas and under-estimation of yields. It is also 
clear that responses to input use are highly variable and 
depend upon both crop varieties (hybrid maize 
showing a substantially greater yield response) and to 
the conditions and management affecting individual 
maize plots (for example time of planning and 
weeding, number of weedings, and rainfall 
distribution) . Yields and programme benefits are thus 
amenable to significant increases from wider adoption 
of improved management practices such as greater 
complementary use of improved seed and inorganic 
and organic fertilisers, more timely and frequent 
weeding, higher plant populations, and earlier planting.   
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Despite considerable efforts attempting to 
reconcile different results from different methods, 
it has not been possible to come up with a single 
set of consistent unbiased estimates of national 
maize yields, areas, and production, or of precise 
impacts of the programme on these. Instead, as in 
the 2006/7 evaluation report, information from a 
large number of secondary sources is used to 
provide an estimate of maize yield response to 
nitrogen, using 18kg grain per kg N for hybrid 
maize varieties and 12kg grain per kg N for local 
maize varieties.  
Table 1 presents estimates of incremental maize 
production using these yield responses to 
inorganic fertiliser (nitrogen) and improved 
(hybrid) seed, with high and low response 
scenarios 20% above and below.  
Table 1. Incremental Production Estimates with 
Low, Medium & High Fertiliser Response (‘000 
MT) 
 Low Medium High 
Displacement 5% 
Local 375 469 563 
Composite 34 43 52 
Hybrid 405 506 608 
Total 815 1,018 1,222 
Displacement 15% 
Local 336 420 504 
Composite 32 39 47 
Hybrid 368 460 552 
Total 736 920 1,104 
 
A total of approximately 200,000MT of 
subsidised fertiliser were disbursed by the 
programme. It is estimated from survey data that 
up to approximately 10% of this was not used by 
smallholders but was bought and used by others 
(for example estate farmers or urban people). 
Very high commercial fertiliser prices and some 
improvements in targeting led to a dramatic fall in 
displacement of unsubsidised fertiliser sales. Thus 
it is likely that around 90% of the 200,000MT 
subsidy sales led to incremental use of fertilisers, 
and consequently, as shown in table 1, to an 
increase in production of between 0.74 and 1.22 
million MT of maize (the overwhelming reported 
use of subsidised fertiliser was on maize).  
Relatively stable maize prices across the year, 
without any spike before the 2010 harvest, is 
evidence of substantial quantities of maize across 
the country, although prices remained relatively 
high in real terms (compared for example with 
prices following the 2005/6 subsidy programme). 
 
Maize market impacts 
A major expected benefit from the programme should 
be low domestic maize prices, but this has not 
occurred, except in the 2006/7 marketing season, 
following the first (2005/6) subsidy year.  The 
continuing relatively high price of maize has 
undermined the achievement of some of the potential 
wider food security and growth benefits of the 
programme over the last few years, as discussed later. 
Figure 2 shows how low and stable prices in 2006/7 
(after the 2005/6 subsidy)  were followed by high and 
highly variable prices in subsequent years, with 
government market interventions not being able to 
stabilise prices below import parity prices (represented 
approximately by the shaded band).  Increased 
production would be expected to bring prices down, 
although prices in 2007/8 were affected by exports of 
over 300,000MT.Stable prices in 2009/10 are evidence 
of good supplies following the 2008/9 subsidy season, 
although the relatively high real prices  are difficult to 
explain.  
Figure 2: Monthly Maize Prices (1990 MK/kg) 
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Source: Compiled from MoAFS / FEWSNet data 
Input Supply Systems  
Effects on the input supply sector have been mixed, 
with stimulation of private sector fertiliser imports and, 
most importantly, of private sector maize seed supply 
and distribution. After useful progress in working with 
private sector fertiliser distributors, their exclusion in 
2008/9 had a damaging effect on the development of 
private sector fertiliser distribution. There are 
arguments for re-evaluating the decision to exclude the 
private sector from retail distribution of subsidized 
fertilizer and re-establishing dialog/partnership 
between the public and private sectors. There is a need 
to explore systems that could allow private sector 
involvement in subsidy distribution in ways that will 
both improve smallholder access to imports from a 
wider number of suppliers while addressing 
government concerns about difficulties in controlling 
budgeted sales and possible coupon diversion to other 
uses.  
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Economic cost benefit analysis  
Economic cost benefit analysis provides a fairly 
narrow means of comparing the benefits and costs 
of the programme, where benefits are measured in 
terms of the value of incremental production.   
As noted earlier, we estimate total incremental 
maize production from the programme as lying 
between 0.74 and 1.22  million MT, around 50% 
of total production expected without the 
programme. Maize prices over the 2009/10 
marketing season averaged around 40MK/kg, but 
in as far as some of the incremental production 
from the programme will have displaced imports 
and kept domestic prices down towards the end of 
the 2009/10 marketing season, the maize 
produced by the programme should be valued 
somewhere between import parity price and 
domestic market prices, suggesting a value of 
around $285 /MT. Table 2 (a) sets out alternative 
estimates of the ratio of benefits  to costs  for the 
2008/9 programme under the incremental 
production scenarios discussed earlier but with 
10% displacement. Since 2008/9 was unusual for 
very high fertiliser prices, Table 2(b) presents 
estimates with fertiliser prices reduced by 50% 
and with some lower maize prices to represent a 
range of more likely future market conditions.  
Table 2(a) Economic Analysis 2008/9 prices 
Maize 
price 
US$/MT 
 Scenario 
 Low Medium High 
270 
BCR 0.722 0.865 0.997 
NPV -80.55 -40.81 -1.07 
FE na na Na 
280 
BCR 0.749 0.897 1.033 
NPV -72.65 -31.16 10.33 
FE na na 4.2% 
290 
BCR 0.776 0.929 1.069 
NPV -64.76 -21.51 21.73 
FE na na 8.8% 
300 
BCR 0.804 0.961 1.105 
NPV -56.86 -11.86 33.13 
FE na na na 
BCR: benefit cost ratio, FE: Fiscal Efficiency, NPV in 
million US$. 
As found in the 2006/7 evaluation, estimated 
programme benefits and efficiency are highly 
sensitive to maize prices, yield responses and 
fertiliser prices. Reducing  fertiliser displacement, 
increasing yield responses, and keeping fertiliser 
prices (and other costs) down are critical for 
raising returns to the programme. With low 
fertiliser responses the BCR is only greater than 
one with low fertiliser prices and high maize 
prices. However as discussed below, the BCR 
overlooks important growth and welfare benefits of the 
programme: these also need to be considered when 
evaluating programme benefits. It should be noted that 
increasing the scale of the programme is likely to lead 
to lower net returns by (a) depressing yield responses 
to fertiliser use, (b) increasing displacement, and (c) 
increasing the marginal opportunity costs of 
investment in the programme. 
Table 2(b) Economic Analysis,  reduced prices 
Maize 
price 
US$/MT 
  Scenario  
  
Low Medium High 
150 
BCR 0.649 0.767 0.873 
NPV -62.78 -44.07 -25.35 
FE na na na 
200 
BCR 0.869 1.022 1.158 
NPV -23.30 4.17 31.65 
FE na 3.4% 25.7% 
250 
BCR 1.091 1.276 1.439 
NPV 16.18 52.41 88.65 
FE 13.1% 42.6% 72.0% 
300 
BCR 1.315 1.530 1.717 
NPV 55.66 100.65 145.65 
FE 45.2% 81.7% 118.2% 
Macro-economic impacts 
The macroeconomic economic environment has 
remained broadly stable despite unexpected high prices 
and costs for fertiliser. With the subsidy contributing to 
increased government deficit spending in the 2008/09 
fiscal year, the subsidy accounting for 60% of the 
MoAFS budget, and MoFA having the largest budget 
among the ministries, there have been major concerns 
about its fiscal and macro-economic sustainability of 
the programme. With dramatic falls in fertiliser prices 
in late 2008 and new limitations on the scope of the 
2009/10 programme, these fears have now eased to 
some extent. However foreign exchange continues to 
be in short supply and there has been some increase in 
inflation in 2009 due to high fuel and maize prices.  
Food security and welfare impacts 
The 2008/9 programme appears to have led to most 
households having improved perceptions of their food 
security situation in the month immediately following 
the 2009 harvest, as compared with their perceptions at 
the same time of year in 2007. There were slightly 
more households dissatisfied with their food security 
situation in the 12 previous months, consistent with the 
high food prices experienced during 2008/9.  
Econometric analysis of household responses over 
three years (2004/5, 2006/7 and 2008/9) suggests that 
subsidised input recipients perceive a food security 
benefit from the programme that extends beyond the 
year immediately following subsidised input receipt.  
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A variety of patterns of changes in welfare and 
wellbeing are found as regards perceptions of 
poverty ranking (which have generally improved), 
and perceived satisfaction with life, which appears 
to benefit in the short term in the season when 
subsidised inputs are received, but not improve 
more permanently.   
A number of other impacts were mentioned 
during interviews, including reduction of begging 
and of the need to work off farm for low wages to 
meet short term food needs; higher school 
enrolments; reduced malnutrition; reduced theft 
and increased grain storage; improved social 
relations; and increased investments in houses and 
businesses. Although there is no evidence linking 
these claims to specific outcomes of the subsidy 
programme, there is evidence for declining 
poverty rates and malnutrition rates since the 
programme began in 2005/6, with the poverty 
headcount falling from 50% in 2005/6 to 40% in 
2007/8, under 5s wasting falling from 6.8 to 5.8%, 
and average meals per day rising from 2.0 to 2.3.  
Very significant increases in maize prices from 
2007 to early 2009 were noted earlier. Ganyu 
wage rates also rose over the same period in 
nominal terms and kept abreast with or just kept 
ahead of maize price increases over the period 
from 2005/6 to 2008/9. Although high maize 
prices raise the programme’s economic benefit: 
cost ratio, BCR analysis largely ignores costs to 
poor consumers of these prices. High domestic 
prices also depress real growth, poverty reduction 
and household food security. Investigation of this 
with indicative modelling of beneficiaries’ and 
non-beneficiaries’ livelihoods and of labour 
markets suggests that poor beneficiary households 
may nevertheless have had real income increases 
of 10% to 100% over the no-subsidy 
counterfactual situation in different years. Poor 
non-beneficiary households may also have had 
real income increases of between 0% and 20%, 
with gains varying between areas, between 
households with different savings behaviour, and 
between years with different subsidy rates and 
maize and labour market conditions. 
This analysis captures part of a very important 
benefit of the programme that is not captured by 
the economic benefit-cost analysis – the way that 
incremental input use should raise the 
productivity of very significant amounts of 
Malawian labour and land otherwise engaged in 
low productivity maize cultivation. With time this 
should spill-over to other parts of the economy, if 
households can be sure they can purchase maize 
reliably and cheaply from the market, without 
relying on their own cultivation for food security.  
It is not possible to quantify other potential impacts of 
the programme in both replenishing soil fertility and 
reducing extended cultivation onto more marginal 
slopes and soils and into forested land. The importance 
of such benefits should, however, be taken into account 
in the design and implementation of the programme 
and complementary activities and investments.  
Costs, crowding out and other negative 
impacts  
This paper has focussed mainly on the considerable 
positive impacts of the programme.  It is important, 
however, to recognise that these are achieved at 
considerable cost. As noted earlier, the financial costs 
of the 2008/9 programme took up a very considerable 
part of the government budget. Total recorded financial 
costs of the programme to the government and donors 
amounted to nearly MK40 billion before recovery of 
farmer redemption payments, nearly MK34 billion 
after their recovery. These costs do not allow for a 
range of other costs incurred by government agencies 
and their staff involved in implementing the 
programme, and the lost productivity of these staff who 
would otherwise be engaged in other productive 
activities. Some of these costs, and costs of farmers 
accessing and using inputs, were allowed for in the 
total estimated costs used in the economic benefit cost 
analysis. Some of the activities that are crowded out by 
the MAISP (such as agricultural research and 
extension) may provide high if not so immediate 
returns on investment. The funds used in the 
programme may also prevent investments in roads, 
schools or health facilities and services, for example.  
To maximise programme benefits it is important that 
the scale and costs of the programme are tightly 
controlled to minimise these crowding out effects, and 
that the resources invested in the programme do yield 
significant and rapid returns to the country, greater 
than could be achieved by their investment elsewhere. 
An important element of this involves ensuring that 
investments reach the intended beneficiaries and are 
coordinated with complementary  policies and 
investments that can improve its effectiveness and 
efficiency, for example  by investing in or encouraging 
rural roads, agricultural research and extension, and the 
development of efficient, effective and reliable private 
sector seed and fertiliser supply and distribution 
systems.  
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